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COMMISSION OF  THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Brussels,  16. I. 1996 
SEC  (96) 41  final 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
EU CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
WITH UZBEI(IST  AN Explanatm-y Mt•morandum 
·nte European Union's contn1ctunl relations with lJzbekist:m 
I.  The  General  Affairs  Council  of  17th  July  1995  invited  the  Con11i1ission  to  hold 
exploratory discussions with  Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, centring in  particular on 
open  questions  regarding  the  treatment  of democracy  and  human  rights  in  these 
countries,  and  to  report  in  view  of a  subsequent  decision  by  the  Council  to  open 
negotiations on Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. 
2.  Such  exploratory  discussions  were  held  in  Uzbekistan  in  July  I  CJCJS.  The  thlld~ 
authorities, at the highest level,  expressed their wish to negotiate such an agreement 
which they sec as an important clement in  their strategy of building up links with the 
West, as a  counterweight to Russian  pressure to become more integrated  into CIS 
political  and  economic stmctures.  They agreed  to  enter into  an  ongoing dialogue 
with  the  ElJ  on  democracy  and  human  rights  questions  and  requested  technical 
assistance in  these fields. 
No such discussions have as yet been held with Turkmenistan, which has so f11r  shown 
little interest in  closer relations with EU or in  an open dialogue on human rights and 
democracy.  The  case of Uzbekistan  should  therefore  be  considered  on  its  own 
merits. 
3.  The Commission considers that: 
a)  it  remains  in  our  political  and  commercial  interests  to  establish  closer  bilateral 
relations, 
b)  following  the  opening  offered  by  Uzbekistan  for  dialogue  on  human  rights  and 
democracy,  it  is  also  in  our interests  to  pursue  our  objectives  in  these  domains 
through intergovernmental cooperation, 
c)  following the Council's decision to negotiate with the Transcaucasian republics,  and 
the  EU's  signature  of PCAs  with  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  and  of the  Interim 
Agrec111cnt  with  Itussia,  it  is  important  to  avoid  conveying  the  impression  to  tlw 
lJzbeks,  who arc potentially our most  valuable  partners in  the  region,  that  the  El J 
wishes to discriminate against them, 
d)  it  would  therefore be  reasonable  to  open  negotiations  with  Uzbekistan  bearing  in 
mind  that  the  negotiating  process  (negotiations,  initialling,  signature,  ratification, 
conclusion)  is  a  long  one  which  can  be  slowed  down  or even  suspended  should 
Uzbekistan fail to make further progress. 
4.  The  reasons  for  adopting  the  above  approach  arc  set  out  in  the  attached 
Communication,  which  constitutes  the  report  requested  by  the  General  All11irs 
Council.  It proposes that negotiations be initiated in  early  1996, while noting that the 
negotiating  process itself provides suflicient  flexibility  to  take  account  of ongoing 
developments in Uzbekistan in the fields ofhurrum rights and democracy. EU RELATIONS WITH UZBEKISTAN 
lntrorlnction 
1.  In  its  Communication  on  relations  with  the  Newly  Independent  States  or Central 
Asia')  ,  the  Commission  reviewed  the  EU's  political,  economic  and  human  rights 
interests  in  the  region,  and  assessed  the  options for  the development  of contractual 
relations with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
The  General  Affairs  Council  of  12  June  1995  invited  the  Commission  to  hold 
exploratory  discussions  with  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan  and  to  report  back  on 
developments  regarding  human  rights  and  democracy,  before  deciding  whether  to 
open Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiations. 
The purpose of this Communication is to consider whether, following the exploratory 
discussions with Uzbekistan which took place on 23-28 July  1995, sufficient advances 
have  been  made  as  to  justify  - under  current  circumstances  - a  decision  to  open 
negotiations. 
2.  No  discussions  with  Turkmenistan  have  yet  been  held.  That  country  has  not  yet 
requested  the  reinforcement  of contractual  links  with  the  Union,  nor  expressed 
readiness to engage in dialogue on  human rights issues.  The Commission is  therefore 
of the view that the case of Uzbekistan should be considered independently from  that 
ofTurkmenistan and on its own merits. 
The cxplor:ttory discussions 
3.  The purpose oft  hese discussions was: 
to establish an overall assessment of developments in democracy and  human  rights and 
to identify main areas which arc lagging behind; 
to  assess  whether there is  an  open  attitude  on  the  part of the  Government  towards 
initiating a dialogue with the EU on these matters, and whether there arc clear signals 
of  a willingness to proceed with reforms; 
to establish whether the government is ready to request EU technical assistance in  key 
democracy related issues and if so, to identify projects for implementation through the 
Tacis Democracy Programme. 
The  discussions  also  enabled  the  Commission  to  assess,  in  consultation  with  the 
embassies  of the  Member  States  in  Tashkent,  the  general  context  within  which  the 
Uzbek request to open negotiations on a PCA should be placed. 
4.  At  a meeting on  27  July  1995  with  Commission  representatives,  which  was  attended 
by  the  embassies  of the  Member  States  representing  the Troika,  President  Karimov 
outlined  his  government's  reform  strategy.  Its  objective  is  to  transform  the  country 
into  a modern  democracy based  on  a multiparty system;  but  the  President's view  is 
that  true  pluralism  can  only  develop  if parliamentarians  genuinely  represent  the 
I) COM (95) 20o interests of difTerent  sectors of society - interests which can only emerge once private 
ownership has  t;~ken full  root  Thus economic reform  must,  in  President  Karimov's 
viL'W,  he a PIL'rcquisill' ror politicalrdimn  At  the sallll'  tillll~. change llliiSt  he gradual 
Too much  haste could exacerbate ctl111ic  tensions or regional  disparities or render the 
reform process itsdfunsustainahle 
In this ongoing process the President attached great importance to strengthening links 
with  the  EU  and  other  Western  partners,  and  to  the  value  of technical  assistance 
through  Tacis,  including  assistance  on  democracy-related  issues.  He  referred  in 
particular to three areas identified by the Commission as essential for the strengthening 
ofthe rule oflaw, i.e.: 
the creation of  a constitutional court, 
strengthening the independence of  the judiciary 
the operation ofthe new Parliamentary human rights Committee. 
However, the President noted that partnership with the EU was an  objective in  itself. 
His request for assistance should not be seen as part of  a "bargain". 
5.  Following this  meeting,  the Justice  Ministry  co-operated  fully  in  setting up  terms of 
reference  f(x  appropriate  projects.  It  is  clear  that  assistance  is  badly  needed  on  a 
whole  range  of democracy-related  questions.  Initially,  the  ElJ's  contribution  will 
concentrate on: 
establishment of  a Constitutional Court 
establishment of  an  Administrative Court, for judicial review of decisions taken by 
the  various  branches  of the  Administration  under  their  respective  powers  and  for 
treating complaints on violations of human rights by the administration 
independence of the judiciary, with special  reference to the training of  judges and 
lawyers  and  to  the  transparency  of judicial  decisions  having  an  effect  upon  the 
interpretation ofthe laws. 
In meetings with the US  Ambassador, the deputy head ofthe UN Mission and the new 
representative of  OSCE, it was agreed that the EU,  US and international organisations 
should co-ordinate their work on human rights and democracy in  Uzbekistan. 
Thr twlili<'al anclt•t·mwmir rnnh·xl 
6.  :t)  Thr slah· of polilir:tl rcfnnu in  lfzlu·kislan 
Uzbekistan  is  not yet  a fully  democratic state,  and  power is  still  concentrated  in  the 
hands of  the President.  However, a basis docs exist for qualitative improvement: 
•  The constitution is a liberal one:  on paper, more so than the new Kazakh constitution 
approved  by  a  much-criticised  referendum  in  August.  The  government  has  just 
announced the establishment of a constitutional court. 
•  The Parliament is functioning.  New parties are being formed.  Uzbck parliamentarians 
already  claim  to  reflect  the  interests  of various  social  constituencies  and  have 
expressed the wish to learn from European parliamenta1y experience. 
•  The government  is  willing  to  work with  international organisations (OSCE,  UNDP) 
and  Western  partners  (EU,  the  Member  States,  and  the  US)  on  human  rights  and 
democracy issues. The major problem  results from  the  fact  that constitutional guarantees arc  not  being 
applied  in  practice  due  to  deficiencies  in  the  legal  system,  the  lack  of competent 
courts, absence of NGOs and  a population and  an administration which arc not aware 
of their  respective  rights  and  obligations.  Although  President  Karimov's  regime  is 
authoritarian,  these problems appear to  be  of a different  order to  those  prevailing  in 
Turkmenistan and  arc  in  many  ways  comparable to  those of other NIS.  Moreover, 
Uzbck society is  probably safer,  stabler and  less  violent than  elsewhere in  the  former 
USSR. 
It  is  the  view  of the  Member  States'  embassies,  as  confirmed  by  other  sources 
including international organisations, that after a disappointing two years following the 
country's independence there have been meaningful improvements in  particular during 
1995.  There  is  a general  impression  that  whereas  in  some  areas  Uzbekistan  lags 
behind other Independent States, in others the reverse is the case. 
h)  The economic confrxf 
Buoyed  up  by  high  world  cotton  prices,  a good  wheat  harvest  and  good  progress 
towards the  government's goal  of self-sufficiency  in  fuel,  the  economy is  performing 
relatively well.  The IMF representative in Tashkent confirmed that Uzbekistan is well 
on  course for  the  conclusion of a stand-by arrangement.  Thanks to  a strong trade 
performance the  budget,  which  was  expected  to  show  a small  deficit,  is  actually  in 
surplus.  There are  no  external financing  problems and  the  IMF  is  satisfied  with  the 
country's  macroeconomic  performance.  The  World  Bank  is  a major  donor,  having 
provided  a $160  m rehabilitation  Joan;  up  to  $300  m is  in  the  pipeline  if present 
assumptions are borne out. 
Industrial  privatisation  is  still  at  an  early  stage.  Uzbekistan  has  rejected  a voucher 
system,  preferring  sale  of minority  shares  with  government  institutions  retaining 
overall  control.  Five  year  tax  holidays  arc  offered  to  overseas  investors,  but  under 
present conditions ve1y few arc likely to buy into existing Uzbek  enterprises.  Whereas 
most  dwellings arc now privately owned,  land  itself remains  the property of the state, 
albeit with long-term (9<) year) leases. 
The  lack  of legal  certainty  represents  a  major  problem  for  investors.  Since  the 
business of  government is carried out largely by decree, the investor cannot be certain 
that  his  rights  will  be  adequately  protected.  It may  be  concluded  that  a  properly 
functioning  legal  system,  including the ability to defend  rights in  court and to invoke 
the  state's  international  obligations,  is  an  essential  requirement  for  the  future 
development of European investments. 
c)  Uzbel<istan's external relations 
Although  the  Uzbck  authorities are  well  aware of the importance of the  Union  as  an 
economic partner their wish to negotiate a PCA  must be seen  primarily  in  its  political 
context.  Uzbekistan's prime objective remains  the  preservation of its  ability  to  make 
sovereign policy decisions.  Its  wish  to intensify relations with the EU  should be  seen 
against the background of  Russian policy towards the other NIS.  The Customs Union 
agreements between Russia,  Belarus,  Kazakhstan  are - as  President  Yeltsin  specified 
in  his  decree on  the CIS  of 14  September - an  important  clement  in  this  process.  It 
will  be  recalled  that  the  Yeltsin  decree  also  specifies  that  third  countries  and 
international  organisations  should  recognise  that  the  region  is  primarily  the  zone  of 
Russia's interest.  Prime Minister Chernomyrdin visited Tasl,kent in  the same week as 
3 the  exploratory discussions  with  the  Ell,  and  on  this  occasion  President  Karimov 
announced  his  country's  wish  to  l'lll\.'r  into  the  customs  union.  /\t  the  end  of 
September  1
1>
1J)  the President  of K;11.akhsti1n  issued  a  decree removing the customs 
posts between his country and  Russia.  The significance of this action for  Uzbekistan 
could be profound:  following  the agreements in  I 994 to remove their own frontier 
posts,  Uzbekistan's  Northern  border  is  now  fully  open,  subject  only  to  checks  on 
transit traflic by  the Kazakh authorities, and controls could not be imposed without 
creating major diflicultics for Uzbekistan with all its major partners. 
Thus,  on  the  one  hand  Uzbekistan  needs  to  find  an  accommodation  with  its  CIS 
partners and especially Russia, but on the other hand it also needs to retain its ability 
to  make independent  decisions  regarding  its  future.  This future  will  in  large  part 
depend on further integration into the global economy and closer links with the West -
especially  the  EU,  where  the  most  important  western  customers  for  Uzbekistan's 
products, particularly cotton and metals, arc to be found.  Uzbekistan is  submitting an 
application to WTO, and has requested EU assistance for this purpose. 
At  the  same  time,  in  the  light  of events  in  Tajikistan  and  Afghanistan  the  Uzbek 
government has sought to resist  pressures from clements wishing to promote Islamic 
llmdamentalism as a basis f(ll· a new llzbek nationalism. 
These arc the  pressures from  both sides  which  arc  pushing  Uzbekistan,  with  some 
urgency, to develop its relations with the West as a counterweight - and in the course 
ofthis, to respond to Western pressures for more democracy and an improved human 
rights regime.  President Karimov's request for  EU technical  assistance  is  the most 
recent and perhaps the most eloquent expression of  this openness. 
Asst'ssmcnt 
7.  In  the  Commission's  view,  Uzbekistan's  pos1t1ve  stance  on  democracy-related 
questions in  the exploratory discussions is  a  new clement which should be taken into 
full  consideration.  I Iowcver  the  Council's  decision  on  whether  to  open  PCA 
negotiations should take into account both human rights considerations and  the EU's 
political and economic interests. 
8.  For the  EU  Uzbekistan is  unquestionably an  important  partner  1  >.  With  23  million 
people it  is  the economic and cultural  heart of the region.  Its geopolitical situation 
between  Russia,  China  and  the  Islamic  world  makes  it  a  valuable  interlocutor. 
Member  States'  bilateral  trade is  already  more  than  three  times  trade  with  all  the 
Caucasian  republics  put  together.  The  country  is  stable.  As  regards  the  Union's 
human rights interests, the Commission's assessment is that a basis for progress docs 
exist;  but a  lot of time and  work is  needed and for this,  long-term cooperation  is 
essential. 
9.  The cxploral01y discussions have served to illustntte why relations with the West, and 
the EU in  particular, f(mll a central component in  llzbekist an's f(neign policy.  In  turn, 
Uzbekistan's wish both to preserve its independence and to resist pressures from  some 
I) In  JIJ9.t,  total trade (imports plus exports) amounted to 'JOX Mccu, a 47%, increase on  l'J'JJ.  Uzbekistan 
was our Jifth largest trading partucr mnong the NIS after Russia, Ukraine, Belarus :~nd Kazakhstan. 
Ut.bekistan's JlOsitive balance (+DO McCII)  is due above all to exports of high  qu:~lity cO(ton aud gold. 
4 nationalist  and  Islamic  fundamentalist  clements  will  be  vital  in  deciding  the  region's 
future  orientation.  Unlike  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan's  ethnic  Russian  population  is 
relatively  small  and  its  economy is  less  interdependent with  Russia's.  These  factors 
have doubtless played a part in  the improvement of Uzbekistan's relations with  the  lJS 
in  the course ofthis year.  They will  also  he crucial  for  lhL~ t·:ll's  mle in  Central  Asia 
The  17  .July  Jill)')  (il'rll'ral  All:rirs  ('uunril's rondusiuns 1rndcrlilll·d  the  1·:1  l's  suppurl 
for  I he independence of  I  hl~ ( 'enlr at  Asian  Sl ales. 
I  0.  President  Karimov's  stated  objective  is  gradually  to  transform  Uzbekistan  into  a 
modern  democracy with  a market  economy:  but  he  has  also  stressed  the  need  for 
gradual change.  There is a genuine fear that too much  haste could exacerbate ethnic 
tensions or regional disparities, or be counter-productive for reform; developments in 
neighbouring countries and in particular in Tajikistan have alarmed many Uzbcks, both 
inside and outside the government. 
II. A decision  regarding  Uzbekistan  should  take  into  account  recent decisions taken by 
the EU concerning contractual  relations with  other newly  independent states.  It has 
been  noted  in  Tashkent that the  Union  is  negotiating with  the three Transcaucasian 
republics;  has signed PCAs with Bclams, and  with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan;  and 
signed  an  Interim  Agreement  with  Russia  as  soon  as  developments  in  Chechnya 
permitted.  Further  delay  would  certainly  he  regarded  in  Tashkent  as  unjustifiable 
discrimination.  It  would  also  represent  a  major  blow  lo  those  who  lirvour  closer 
rl'lations  with  the  West  and  especially  the  l~l!  and  who  have  been,  in  consequence, 
pleading l(lr a more llcxihle policy on human rights and democracy issues. 
A window of opportunity exists for the EU  to constmct a strong relationship  with  a 
potentially highly significant partner - a relationship would allow the Union to initiate 
an ongoing dialogue on, inter alia, human rights and democracy issues and so influence 
developments in a positive way. 
Rcrornrncndations 
12. a)  The Commission concludes that following the exploratory discussions,  it  would be 
in the Union's human rights interests, as well as its political and economic interests, to 
initiate  PCA  negotiations  without  further  delay,  based  on  the  1992  negotiating 
mandate.  The Uzbek authorities should therefore be informed of  the EU's willingness 
to hold a first  round in the first  months of I  096. 
h)  As  I he  concrete  results  of the  technical  assistance  projects  under  the  Tacis 
Democracy Programme mounted in  I  (J<J5-%  will  not  yet  be visible, the EU  should usc 
the PCA  process itself as continued leverage.  The PCA should serve as a vehicle for 
further dialogue on human rights and  democracy,  and  the EU should continue to usc 
technical  assistance  to  support  this  dialogue.  The  entire  process,  (negotiation, 
initialling,  signature,  ratification and  conclusion) can  be  expected to  last at  least  two 
years.  This will  provide ample opportunity for the Union to take account of ongoing 
developments, and ifthesc are negative, to take appropriate steps. 
c)  The Commission will  implement technical assistance programmes under the Tacis 
Democracy  Programme  as  agreed  with  the  Uzbck  authorities.  If the  means  arc 
available it  will seck to intensify this cooperation.  In doing so it will  continue to liaise 
closely with other donors including the Member States. 
5 